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Comment 
2018 CHANGES TO THE EVIDENCE ACT AND  
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE 
The Criminal Justice Reform Bill and  
Evidence (Amendment) Bill 
Various portions of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) 
and Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) were 
amended in 2018 vide the Criminal Justice Reform Bill 
(Bill 14 of 2018) and Evidence (Amendment) Bill (Bill 15 of 
2018); this was a continuation of a series of gradual but 
important changes to the criminal justice system that had 
begun in 2010 when the old Criminal Procedure Code 
(Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) was replaced. This legislation 
comment outlines and briefly analyses some of the most 
substantive changes brought about by the 2018 amendments: 
the video-recording of interviews in criminal proceedings; 
the introduction of a psychiatrist panel to regulate the 
reception of evidence from expert psychiatric witnesses in 
criminal proceedings; and the use of deferred prosecution 
agreements for certain corporate offenders. 
CHEN Siyuan* 
LLB (National University of Singapore), LLM (Harvard); 
Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
Eunice CHUA 
LLB (National University of Singapore), LLM (Harvard); 
Assistant Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
1 Following a relatively lengthy period of wide-ranging public 
consultations in 2017 to strengthen Singapore’s criminal justice 
framework1 and fairly robust debates in Parliament,2 a slew of 
amendments was made to the Evidence Act3 (“EA”) and Criminal 
                                                          
* The authors thank Chia Chen Wei and Melissa Ng for their research assistance. All 
errors remain the authors’. 
1 See Ministry of Law, “Responses to Feedback Received from the Public 
Consultation on Proposed Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code and 
Evidence Act” (28 February 2018) <https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/dam/ 
minlaw/corp/News/Response%20to%20Public%20Consultation%20Feedback.pdf> 
(accessed July 2018). 
2 See Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (19 March 2018) vol 94. 
3 Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed. 
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Procedure Code4 (“CPC”) in March 2018 vide the Criminal Justice 
Reform Bill5 and Evidence (Amendment) Bill6 (collectively referred to 
herein as the “Reform Bill”).7 According to the Senior Minister of State 
for Law who tabled the amendments in Parliament, this was a bid to 
continue the country’s march – the CPC had been overhauled and 
substantially rewritten back in 2010, for instance – towards a “more 
progressive, balanced and modern criminal justice system”.8 
2 This legislation comment outlines and briefly analyses some of 
the most substantive statutory changes brought about by the 2018 
amendments: first, the video-recording of interviews (“VRIs”) when 
statements are taken in criminal proceedings;9 secondly, the 
introduction of a psychiatrist panel to regulate the reception of evidence 
from expert psychiatric witnesses in criminal proceedings;10 and finally, 
the use of deferred prosecution agreements (“DPAs”) for certain 
corporate offenders.11 Each change will now be considered in seriatim. 
I. Video-recording of interviews 
A. Evidential difficulties that arise when statements are alleged to 
have been recorded involuntarily 
3 Under the CPC, the recording of statements of accused persons 
must comply with both procedural and substantive requirements.12 The 
former is straightforward and seldom presents great evidential 
                                                          
4 Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed. 
5 Bill 14 of 2018. 
6 Bill 15 of 2018. 
7 This was later passed as the Criminal Justice Reform Act 2018 (Act 19 of 2018), but 
for convenience, reference to the bill and its clauses will be maintained in this 
piece. In total, 52 changes were made to various portions of the Evidence Act 
(Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) and Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed). 
Those changes, other than those discussed herein, pertained to areas such as abuse 
of process, bail, computer evidence, female suspects, vulnerable victims, victim 
compensation and community sentencing. 
8 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (19 March 2018) vol 94 (Indranee 
Rajah, Senior Minister of State for Finance and Law). Other changes that were part 
of this series include amending the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) in 2012 
regarding the cross-examination of sexual offence complainants and (also in that 
year) giving the courts sentencing discretion over the death penalty for certain 
types of homicide and drug trafficking offences. 
9 See paras 3–15 below. 
10 See paras 16–27 below. 
11 See paras 28–44 below. 
12 The procedural requirements are mainly found in ss 22 and 23 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed). 
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difficulties in terms of proving compliance,13 though the implications for 
breach in extreme cases can be severe and lead to the complete exclusion 
of such statements.14 In respect of the latter, s 258(3) provides that the 
court shall refuse to admit the statement of an accused person:15 
… if the making of the statement appears to the court to have been 
caused by any inducement, threat or promise having reference to the 
charge against the accused, proceeding from a person in authority and 
sufficient, in the opinion of the court, to give the accused grounds 
which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making 
the statement he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a 
temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him. 
4 If a statement is alleged by the accused person to have violated 
the aforesaid prohibition, the court will conduct an ancillary hearing16 to 
make a finding on the issue – and unlike the admissibility of most other 
types of evidence generally,17 the CPC makes it plain that there is no 
judicial discretion to admit the statement if there has been a violation of 
s 258(3). The burden of proof is on the Prosecution to show, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that no breach of s 258(3) has occurred.18 Further, it 
should be noted that s 258(3) applies to both long statements (otherwise 
known as investigation statements) and cautioned statements.19 Such 
statements often contain highly inculpatory evidence – including 
confessions – and their admissibility can therefore have a great bearing 
on whether an accused person is successfully convicted or acquitted, 
especially when there is a paucity of direct evidence proving or 
disproving the offence in question.20 
                                                          
13 Specifically, these requirements are that the statement must be in writing, 
read over to the accused person, interpreted for the accused person in a language 
that he understands if he does not understand English, and be signed by the 
accused person. 
14 See Muhammad bin Kadar v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 1205 at [140]–[147]. 
15 Explanation 2 to this provision clarifies that if: 
… a statement is obtained from an accused by a person in authority who had 
acted in such a manner that his acts tend to sap and have in fact sapped the 
free will of the maker of the statement, and the court is of the opinion that 
such acts gave the accused grounds which would appear to the accused 
reasonable for supposing that by making the statement, he would gain any 
advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the 
proceedings against him, such acts will amount to a threat, an inducement or 
a promise, as the case may be, which will render the statement inadmissible. 
16 See s 279(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed). Previously, 
this was known as a voir dire or a trial-within-a-trial. 
17 See generally Chen Siyuan & Lionel Leo, The Law of Evidence in Singapore 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 2018) ch 2. 
18 See, for instance, Tey Tsun Hang v Public Prosecutor [2014] 2 SLR 1189 at [83]. 
19 See generally Chen Siyuan & Lionel Leo, The Law of Evidence in Singapore 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 2018) ch 7. 
20 See generally Chen Siyuan & Lionel Leo, The Law of Evidence in Singapore 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 2018) ch 7. 
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5 However, how does a court ascertain with sufficient confidence 
where the truth lies if, say, an accused person claims that he was 
threatened or induced into making a particularly inculpatory statement, 
but the investigator flatly denies making any threat or inducement? 
Without the benefit of video recordings, the recording of statements is 
ultimately a process without witnesses apart from the makers and takers 
of the statement, and one would think that if there was indeed, say, any 
threat made to an accused person, the authorities would unlikely be so 
careless so as to leave behind an incriminating trail of physical or 
medical evidence.21 In this regard, it should also be borne in mind that 
even though the right to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution of 
the Republic of Singapore22 (“Constitution”) for criminal cases,23 the 
Court of Appeal has consistently maintained that accused persons who 
have been brought in for investigations do not have an immediate right 
to counsel – reasonable time must be given for the necessary police 
investigations to take place first, which would include the taking of 
statements.24 
6 In most situations, therefore, it is ultimately a case of whose 
account the court chooses to believe more than the other or whether the 
court sufficiently believes an account, since independent witnesses and 
counsel would not be available to testify directly as to whether there was 
any threat, inducement, promise or oppression during the recording of 
statements. The court in this endeavour can of course have recourse to 
the demeanour and credibility of the accused person and the officer who 
recorded the statement when they take the stand in court to be cross-
examined, as well as any surrounding circumstances that corroborate 
either account,25 but the question is whether there are better ways to 
promote due process rights for accused persons – without unduly 
                                                          
21 As it were, allegations of breaches of s 258(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code 
(Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) almost never succeed: see generally Chen Siyuan & Lionel 
Leo, The Law of Evidence in Singapore (Sweet & Maxwell, 2018) ch 7. 
22 1999 Reprint. 
23 Article 9(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint) states: 
Where a person is arrested, he shall be informed as soon as may be of the 
grounds of his arrest and shall be allowed to consult and be defended by a 
legal practitioner of his choice. 
 In capital cases, the State would also provide legal assistance under the Legal 
Assistance Scheme for Capital Offences; the Criminal Legal Aid Scheme exists for 
needy accused persons in less serious crimes. 
24 James Raj s/o Arokiasamy v Public Prosecutor [2014] 3 SLR 750 at [29]–[33]. 
25 See, for instance, Tey Tsun Hang v Public Prosecutor [2014] 2 SLR 1189  
at [100]–[108]. 
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hampering investigative efforts by the authorities, allowing the system to 
be abused or expending great resources.26 
B. Whether video recordings are a plausible solution 
7 The 2018 amendments to the CPC introduced VRIs to address 
this evidential difficulty, albeit in a rather guarded way.27 During the 
second reading of the Reform Bill, the Senior Minister of State for Law 
explained that VRIs would “assist the Courts to try cases more 
effectively when investigation statements are sought to be admitted” 
because they “will be able to take into account the interviewee’s 
demeanour” and “provide an objective account of the interview, to assist 
the Court in deciding on any allegations made about the conduct of the 
interview”.28 In other words, this obviates the need for either the 
interviewer or interviewee to recall details of an interview that took 
place some time ago since there is now an objective record of the event. 
A Member of Parliament (“MP”) also pointed out that VRIs will:29 
… [set] the record straight with regard to allegations of oppression, 
inducement, threat or promise – issues that go towards admissibility. 
The evidence-gathering process would hence become more 
                                                          
26 As to whether due process and crime control are necessarily antithetical to each 
other, see Melanie Chng, “Modernising the Criminal Justice Framework: The 
Criminal Procedure Code 2010” (2011) 23 SAcLJ 23. 
27 It should be noted that the possibility of introducing the video-recording of 
interviews was already mentioned in Parliament in 2016, but the Government said 
it needed more time to conduct feasibility studies: Singapore Parliamentary 
Debates, Official Report (10 October 2016) vol 94 at p 108 (K Shanmugam, 
Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Law). The Government was to repeat 
its stance in 2017: Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (3 March 2017) 
vol 94 (Desmond Lee, Senior Minister of State for Home Affairs and National 
Development). 
28 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (19 March 2018) vol 94 (Indranee 
Rajah, Senior Minister of State for Finance and Law). See also cl 62 of the Criminal 
Justice Reform Bill (Bill 14 of 2018), which amends s 235 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”). The relevant part (s 235(7)) 
states: 
… where a statement made by a person is recorded in the form of an 
audiovisual recording, if a court considers that the production of the 
audiovisual recording is necessary of desirable for the purposes of any 
inquiry, trial or other proceeding … the court may only order the prosecution 
to do either or both of the following: 
(a) to produce the audiovisual recording in court; 
(b) to arrange for the defence to view the audiovisual recording at 
the police station or any other prescribed place. 
 The new s 264A of the CPC also confirms that statements recorded in the form of 
audiovisual recordings can be admissible evidence to the same extent and to the 
same effect as oral evidence given by the person. 
29 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (19 March 2018) vol 94 
(Christopher de Souza). 
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transparent and there can be no allegations of the statement not being 
read back in a language the accused is familiar with. 
Further, beyond ensuring fairness to accused persons, VRIs will “reduce 
the likelihood of frivolous allegations being made against investigators 
which in turn will save court time”.30 At the same time, potential police 
misconduct will probably be greatly deterred if there is knowledge that 
interviews will be video-recorded, and in turn, there will be greater 
confidence in the criminal justice process.31 
8 Despite these perceived advantages to both accused persons and 
the investigating authorities, it was made clear that VRIs would be 
implemented in staggered stages as the Government took the view that 
the introduction of such technology required “significant investment of 
infrastructure and training”, and that the first phase of offences for 
which VRIs would apply to in the interim would be a limited category of 
sexual offences.32 Presumably, subsequent types of offences to be 
eventually included would be prioritised based on the gravity of the 
offence (and concomitantly, the severity of the potential penalties) – 
offences involving severe violence readily come to mind. But what 
complications in using VRIs might give the Government some pause in 
implementing it across a wider spectrum of offences? To appraise this, 
one must consider how the VRI amendment was framed. Clause 6 of the 
Reform Bill first states that s 22(3) of the CPC (s 22 governs the 
procedure for long or investigation statements) will be replaced with the 
following subsections: 
(3) Subject to subsection (5), a statement made by a person 
examined under this section must be recorded — 
                                                          
30 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (19 March 2018) vol 94 (Sylvia 
Lim). 
31 See generally Alex Birtles, “The European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture and the Electronic Recording of Police Interviews with Suspects” (2001) 
1 Hum Rts L Rev 67; Thomas Sullivan, “Recording Federal Custodial Interviews” 
(2008) 45 Am Crim L Rev 1297. 
32 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (19 March 2018) vol 94 (Indranee 
Rajah, Senior Minister of State for Finance and Law). It was also added in 
Parliament that the police: 
… have a training programme in place, for taking statements while on 
camera. They go through a four-day course which includes interview skills, 
administrative procedures in conducting a video interview and how to tackle 
equipment failure. This is vital for consistency in the way video interviews are 
conducted … The Police will fine-tune the training programme, as they gain 
experience from the use of VRIs. 
 See Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (19 March 2018) vol 94 
(Indranee Rajah, Senior Minister of State for Finance and Law). 
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(a) in writing; or 
(b) in the form of an audiovisual recording. 
… 
(5) Where, before a person makes a statement under this section, 
any police officer or forensic specialist examining the person 
reasonably suspects the person of having committed an offence 
specified in the Third Schedule,[33] any statement made by the person 
during the examination must be recorded in the form of an 
audiovisual recording, unless any of the following applies: 
(a) due to an operational exigency, it is not feasible to 
record the statement in the form of an audiovisual 
recording;34 
(b) the equipment designated for recording the 
statement in the form of an audiovisual recording — 
(i) does not work; and 
(ii) cannot be repaired or replaced within a 
reasonable time; 
(c) the person requests that the statement be recorded 
in writing instead of in the form of an audiovisual recording, 
and the police officer or forensic specialist examining the 
person reasonably believes that the granting of the request 
will facilitate the investigation. 
(6) Despite subsection (5) — 
(a) a mere failure to comply with subsection (5) does 
not render a statement by a person examined under this 
section inadmissible if the statement is otherwise admissible; 
and 
(b) no inference is to be drawn by the court from a 
mere failure to comply with that subsection. 
                                                          
33 That is, ss 375–377B of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed), which pertain to 
rape, sexual assault by penetration, sexual penetration of minor, commercial sex 
with minor, commercial sex with minor outside Singapore, tour outside Singapore 
for commercial sex with minor, sexual grooming of minor, procurement of sex 
with person with mental disability, incest, sexual penetration of a corpse, outrages 
on decency, and sexual penetration with living animal. 
34 As explained in Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (19 March 2018) 
vol 94 (Indranee Rajah, Senior Minister of State for Finance and Law): 
For example, there may be a need to record a handwritten contemporaneous 
statement from an accused person at the scene of the crime, when the person 
is arrested at the scene. The legislation allows for flexibility to take into 
account such operational exigencies. 
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9 Clause 7 of the Reform Bill then replaces ss 23(3) and 23(5) of 
the CPC (s 23 governs the procedure for cautioned statements) with 
subsections that are identical to cl 6, save for the following: 
(6) Where a statement made by an accused, in answer to a notice 
read to the accused under subsection (1), is recorded in the form of an 
audiovisual recording — 
(a) if requested by the defence, arrangements must be 
made for the accused and the accused’s advocate (if any) to 
view the audiovisual recording of the statement, as soon as 
practicable after the audiovisual recording is made, at a 
police station or at any other prescribed place; and[35] 
(b) if a transcript of the audiovisual recording is made, 
a copy of the transcript must be given to the accused as soon 
as practicable after the transcript is made. 
10 Perhaps the most immediate questions that arise from a plain 
reading of the amended ss 22 and 23 of the CPC are not from what is 
stated, but what is not stated therein or in any of the other related CPC 
provisions that were amended.36 One such question relates to the 
existence of safeguards to ensure accuracy and reliability of the 
evidence, since the audiovisual recording is in most cases meant to be a 
substitute or alternative to the written statement (as the amended 
ss 22(3), 23(3) and 23(3E) suggest), particularly for offences that fall 
under ss 22(5) and 23(3B). More specifically, as noted by an MP during 
the second reading of the Reform Bill, how does one know if the 
recording captures the entire interrogation process – a threat may have 
been made before the recording started, for instance, or there might 
have been multiple rounds of pre-questioning before the recording that 
weakened the resolve of the accused person.37 The same MP also said 
that the recording could be manipulated at various points, from how the 
camera frames the shot to how the footage is edited before being made 
                                                          
35 See also cll 42, 52 and 54 of the Criminal Justice Reform Bill (Bill 14 of 2018), 
which amend ss 166, 214 and 218 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 
2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”) respectively. The new s 225B also states that the Prosecution 
is not required to produce either the audiovisual recording or a copy of that 
recording to the defence for statements made under s 22 of the CPC. 
36 These include ss 225B, 235 and 264A of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 
2012 Rev Ed). Due to space constraints, matters related to privacy, legal 
professional privilege and vulnerable interviewees will not be discussed here. 
37 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (19 March 2018) vol 94 
(Kok Heng Leun, Nominated Member of Parliament). In fairness, even in fairly 
liberal jurisdictions such as Australia, Canada and the UK, there is no mandatory 
requirement to videotape interrogations, even if the practice is commonplace. 
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available for viewing.38 And even if the recording is not manipulated, 
what happens if the equipment malfunctions (whether before, during, 
or after the recording) in some way or runs out of storage space?39 
What happens if parts of the recording have only sound or picture but 
not the other?40 
11 To begin answering any of these questions, one ought to first 
recognise the evidentiary role and weight given to VRIs. Like a 
statement that was recorded on paper rather than on tape, it can be said 
that a VRI would ordinarily be hearsay unless its admissibility is 
provided for in either the EA or CPC, though one could of course 
simply recharacterise it as “real” evidence of the fact that something was 
said and funnel it under some broader admissibility scheme,41 or less 
drastically, the court can rely solely on any written statement given 
without recourse to any VRI or decide matters based on weight. But 
regardless of the admissibility route taken, it is likely that any given VRI 
would assume a critical evidentiary role in disproving any allegations of 
impropriety during the recording of statements. However, as mentioned, 
the amended ss 22 and 23 of the CPC only focus on when a VRI may be 
dispensed with and what happens when not all of the procedural 
requirements in the VRI are complied with (for completeness, the 
sections also cover the accused’s access to the VRI) but stops short of 
explicating the safeguards of ensuring VRI reliability and also the 
consequences of conflicting evidence or problematic recordings.42 In 
this connection, the practice of foreign jurisdictions may be instructive. 
12 In the UK, for instance, the Code of Practice to the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 198443 states that: the recording must ensure 
coverage of as much of the room as practically possible so that there are 
no blind spots; steps should be taken to prevent a situation where the 
                                                          
38 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (19 March 2018) vol 94 
(Kok Heng Leun, Nominated Member of Parliament). See also Post-Corroboration 
Safeguards Review: Report of the Academic Expert Group (James Chalmers, Fiona 
Leverick & Alasdair Shaw eds) (August 2014) at p 122. 
39 For instance, the audio was not captured or certain portions of the recording are 
corrupted. 
40 As mentioned, since the amended ss 22 and 23 of the Criminal Procedure Code 
(Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) only require a statement to be recorded either in written or 
audiovisual form, the question of what happens if the recording appears to show 
words different from what are found in the written statement should not arise. 
41 See generally Chen Siyuan & Lionel Leo, The Law of Evidence in Singapore 
(Sweet & Maxwell: 2018) ch 4. 
42 Although the provisions do not state so, if the Australian approach were to be 
followed, a failure to provide good reasons for why audiovisual recordings were 
not made could result in the exclusion of any unrecorded confessions: see, 
for instance, R v Schiavini [1999] NSWCCA 165. 
43 c 60 (UK). 
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front of the interviewee or interviewer is not captured; and if the 
recording device fails, the interview will be stopped, the unaffected parts 
will be digitally secured and the remainder of the interview 
recommenced in new recording media.44 Going a step or two further, in 
Australia, statements made during a break in a recorded interview are 
inadmissible, as are those made after the recorded interview had ceased 
and no further questions were being asked.45 In light of the above, it 
would seem that the easiest way to ensure reliability and accuracy – and 
also to alleviate concerns about how the framing of the shot might have 
different psychological effects46 – is to have multiple (at least two, if not 
three) cameras placed throughout the interview room, armed with the 
appropriate lenses and image quality, to be in operation when the 
statement is taken. Footage should be doubly backed during the 
interview and securely archived, and any breaks in the interview must 
be properly accounted for (for instance, by leaving the recording 
running). Doing all of this is neither unduly expensive nor difficult in 
this day and age of digital video technology, though it may be difficult to 
completely rule out the possibility that the accused person might have 
been put under pressure to confess even before the interview is 
recorded. That is not something VRIs can or are meant to solve.47 
13 Another issue that VRIs cannot solve is people placing undue 
reliance on them for various reasons. Those who believe that VRIs will 
make it more possible for false confessions to be detected need to bear 
in mind that the consensus among researchers who study the detection 
of falsehoods is that people generally do little better than chance when it 
                                                          
44 Code E: Revised Code of Practice on Visual Recording with Sound of Interview 
with Suspects (May 2018) at para 2. 
45 Kelly v R [2004] HCA 12; Nicholls v R, Coates v R [2005] HCA 1. 
46 A considerable body of research demonstrates the existence of “illusory causation”. 
In the context of the video-recording of interviews this means that: 
… video-recorded confessions made with the camera focused on the suspect 
would lead observers to assess that the suspect’s statements were more 
voluntary and conclude that the suspect was more likely to be guilty than if 
the camera focused on the interrogator or on both the suspect and 
interrogator equally. 
 See Daniel Lassiter & Matthew Lindberg, “Video Recording Custodial 
Interrogations: Implications of Psychological Science for Policy and Practice” 
(2010) 38 Journal of Psychiatry and Law 177 at 185. 
47 See Post-Corroboration Safeguards Review: Report of the Academic Expert Group 
(James Chalmers, Fiona Leverick & Alasdair Shaw eds) (August 2014) at p 122. It 
should also be noted that this is a different issue from when the recording should 
begin – in other jurisdictions, the recording can only begin when there is 
reasonable belief that the interviewee has committed an offence, but s 22 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) is broad enough not to create this 
dilemma. 
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comes to separating lies from the truth.48 In fact, people perform 
relatively worse, when they rely primarily on visual cues, particularly 
those emanating from a person’s face, when making judgments on 
veracity.49 There is also what psychologists term “fundamental attribution 
error”, which is the phenomenon of observers tending to attribute 
people’s actions to internal causes (dispositions or intentions) even when 
external forces or pressures in the situation could readily account for 
their actions.50 In the context of VRIs, this means that false confessions 
may not be as easily detected as one would think. The usefulness of 
VRIs is further complicated by “expectancy effects” as people who 
expect or desire to see different things very often end up seeing different 
things despite being shown the same recording.51 
14 Then there may also be concerns about whether VRIs may have 
some sort of chilling effect on accused persons in that they would be less 
likely to speak candidly, and therefore confessions may not be as 
forthcoming. In the US, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts has 
dispelled the former, saying that:52 
… [t]he principal objection to recording of interrogations springs 
from the fear that suspects will refuse to talk at all, or will decline to 
make a full confession, if they know they are being recorded. Based on 
experience to date in other jurisdictions, those fears appear 
exaggerated. Moreover, what is posed as an objection to recording of 
interrogations is itself inherently contrary to our requirement of a 
knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to remain silent. 
On this point, it should also be borne in mind that in Singapore, while 
accused persons are not obligated to divulge incriminatory information 
during the recording of cautioned statements as part of the privilege 
against self-incrimination,53 they must divulge potentially exculpatory 
                                                          
48 Daniel Lassiter & Matthew Lindberg, “Video Recording Custodial Interrogations: 
Implications of Psychological Science for Policy and Practice” (2010) 38 Journal of 
Psychiatry and Law 177 at 184. 
49 Daniel Lassiter & Matthew Lindberg, “Video Recording Custodial Interrogations: 
Implications of Psychological Science for Policy and Practice” (2010) 38 Journal of 
Psychiatry and Law 177 at 184. 
50 Daniel T Gilbert & Patrick S Malone, “The Correspondence Bias” (1995) 
117(1) Psychological Bulletin 21 at 24, citing Lee Ross, “The Intuitive Psychologist 
and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process” in Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology vol 10 (Leonard Berkowitz ed) (Academic Press: 
1977) at p 174. 
51 Daniel Lassiter & Matthew Lindberg, “Video Recording Custodial Interrogations: 
Implications of Psychological Science for Policy and Practice” (2010) 38 Journal of 
Psychiatry and Law 177 at 182–183. 
52 Commonwealth v DiGiambattista 442 Mass 423 at 443–444. 
53 See, for instance, s 23(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed). 
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information or risk having adverse inferences drawn against them.54 
Furthermore, the amended ss 22 and 23 of the CPC give the interviewee 
the option to request not to have the interview recorded. 
15 All things considered, there is no doubt that the introduction of 
VRIs is a welcome development in improving confidence in the criminal 
justice process and also an important step taken to minimise wrongful 
convictions predicated on coerced confessions. As explained above, 
there should not be any real difficulty, operational or otherwise, in 
ensuring the reliability and accuracy of VRIs, and the implementation of 
VRIs across a wider spectrum of offences should be feasible in the 
foreseeable future. The challenge would be for lawyers and judges to be 
trained to deal appropriately with VRIs so that they may be fairly 
interpreted and used. 
II. Panel of psychiatrists 
A. General framework for admitting expert opinion evidence 
16 We turn then to the next substantive change, the introduction of 
an accredited panel for expert psychiatrists testifying in criminal cases. 
Under longstanding common law rules of evidence, opinion evidence is 
by default inadmissible for lack of relevance and reliability (it is also for 
the court, and not witnesses, to draw the necessary inferences from 
facts, putting aside the withering influence of the ultimate issue rule).55 
Notwithstanding its fundamentally different admissibility paradigm, the 
EA implicitly acknowledges this general prohibition, but also recognises 
that expert opinion evidence may be of value to the courts. Under s 
47(1) of the EA: 
… when the court is likely to derive assistance from an opinion upon a 
point of scientific, technical or other specialised knowledge, the 
opinions of experts upon that point are relevant facts. 
This gateway of admissibility, however, is subject to s 47(4), which states 
that an opinion “which is otherwise relevant under subsection (1) shall 
not be relevant if the court is of the view that it would not be in the 
interests of justice to treat it as relevant”.56 The factors to be considered 
                                                          
54 This privilege, however, has been described by the Court of Appeal as being 
neither a constitutional rule nor rule of natural justice: Public Prosecutor v Mazlan 
bin Maidun [1992] 3 SLR(R) 968 at [15]–[19]. 
55 See generally Chen Siyuan & Lionel Leo, The Law of Evidence in Singapore 
(Sweet & Maxwell: 2018) ch 6. 
56 For a general overview of the admissibility paradigm under the Evidence Act 
(Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed), see Chen Siyuan, “Redefining Relevancy and Exclusionary 
Discretion in Sir James Fitzjames Stephen’s Indian Evidence Act of 1872: The 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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under the “interests of justice” test include reliability, costs, delay, 
relevance, prejudice, fairness, and tendency to distract or confuse.57 The 
EA does not distinguish between civil and criminal cases under this 
general framework for admitting expert opinion evidence.58 
17 For further context, s 47 of the EA was amended in 2012, 
broadening the admissibility gateway for expert evidence. Whereas the 
previous touchstone of admissibility was based on whether the expert 
opinion pertained to fixed categories of assistance (foreign law, science 
or art, or handwriting or finger impressions), the current iteration of 
sub-s (1) conceives of possibility of assistance to the court in a much 
larger realm and using a lower threshold of admissibility, though of 
course the court is now expressly given the power not to admit the 
evidence by virtue of sub-s (4).59 There is no mistaking, however, that 
Parliament intended s 47 to be interpreted and applied broadly.60 This 
position was an endorsement of the notion that as litigation becomes 
more complex, parties in adversarial proceedings should have the liberty 
to craft their cases and call upon witnesses as they see fit – in civil cases 
at least.61 This would explain as well the 2012 introduction of sub-s (3) 
to s 47, which clarified that the common knowledge rule would be no 
bar to admitting expert opinion evidence. 
18 To be clear, the scope of s 47 of the EA – even after the 2012 
amendments – continues to be delineated by case law, whether for civil 
or criminal proceedings. For instance, the purported expert should be 
properly qualified. This goes beyond perusing paper qualifications and 
asserting credentials as it requires a close examination by the court of 
the expert’s training and experience in the relevant field.62 The expert 
also has an overriding obligation to the court to be independent and 
truthful to the court, even if his services may be paid for exclusively by a 
party.63 A lack of independence may be evinced from a lack of coherence 
                                                                                                                               
Singapore Experiment and Lessons for Other Indian Evidence Act Jurisdictions” 
(2014) 10(1) ICE 1 and Chen Siyuan & Eunice Chua, “The Indian Evidence Act 
and Recent Formulations of the Exclusionary Discretion in Singapore” (2018) 
15(1) ICE 1. 
57 Gimpex Ltd v Unity Holdings Business Ltd [2015] 2 SLR 686 at [106], albeit in the 
context of interpreting the hearsay equivalent of this provision. 
58 See also ANB v ANC [2015] 5 SLR 522 at [29]. 
59 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (14 February 2012) vol 88 
(K Shanmugam, Minister for Law). 
60 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (14 February 2012) vol 88 
(K Shanmugam, Minister for Law). 
61 See generally Chen Siyuan & Lionel Leo, The Law of Evidence in Singapore 
(Sweet & Maxwell: 2018) ch 6. 
62 See, for instance, Leong Wing Kong v Public Prosecutor [1994] 1 SLR(R) 681. 
63 See, for instance, Pacific Recreation Pte Ltd v S Y Technology [2008] 2 SLR(R) 491. 
© 2018 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders. 
 
 
 Singapore Academy of Law Journal  
 
and rationality in the expert’s report or testimony to the court;64 indeed, 
prior to testifying in court, experts are expected to furnish detailed 
grounds – including the consideration of plausible adverse premises – to 
justify the conclusions they reach, and where there is interaction with 
witnesses required (for instance, a doctor examining a patient), they are 
expected to conduct such interactions professionally.65 None of these 
extensive requirements should be surprising, given the courts’ 
increasingly heavy reliance on expert testimony66 and the prohibition on 
courts from unduly overruling such testimony with their own opinion.67 
B. Whether it is necessary to reduce pool of psychiatric experts in 
criminal proceedings 
19 If the regime for admitting expert opinion evidence generally is 
already fairly robust, why is there a need to treat psychiatrists testifying 
in criminal cases differently by essentially creating an additional hurdle 
to admissibility? As it were, Singapore continues to retain many aspects 
of the “crime control” model (as opposed to the “due process” model) of 
criminal justice, and it is also generally accepted that the resources 
available to accused persons, be it in the form of legal representation or 
access to evidence, are more limited when compared to civil 
proceedings.68 When it comes to criminal proceedings, the role of 
psychiatric experts is to either advance – or dispute – the fundamental 
claim that an accused person did not have a culpable state of mind such 
as to be found guilty of an offence, or at the very least, there should be 
mitigation of the punishment. But the effect of limiting the pool of 
psychiatric experts via the introduction of some sort of a clearing 
selection committee to accredit them would more likely negatively affect 
accused persons than the Prosecution, given that the rate of successfully 
pleading mental defences is already considerably low – a consequence 
that should not be lightly ignored, in view of the potentially harsh penal 
sanctions in Singapore upon conviction and the considerable costs that 
hiring an expert usually entails.69 
                                                          
64 See, for instance, JSI Shipping (S) Pte Ltd v Teofoongwonglcloong [2007] 
4 SLR(R) 460. 
65 See, for instance, Pacific Recreation Pte Ltd v S Y Technology [2008] 2 SLR(R) 491. 
66 See generally Chen Siyuan & Lionel Leo, The Law of Evidence in Singapore 
(Sweet & Maxwell: 2018) ch 6. 
67 See, for instance, Tengku Jonaris Badlishah v Public Prosecutor [1999] 1 SLR(R) 800 
and Sakthivel Punithavathi v Public Prosecutor [2007] 2 SLR(R) 983. 
68 See generally Chin Tet Yung, “Remaking the Evidence Code: Search for Values” 
(2009) 21 SAcLJ 97 and Melanie Chng, “Modernising the Criminal Justice 
Framework: The Criminal Procedure Code 2010” (2011) 23 SAcLJ 23. 
69 Indeed, what is interesting is that in the past decade, although the Singapore courts 
have not held back their criticisms when the Prosecution’s expert witnesses have 
been unprofessional or overzealous (see, for instance, Eu Lim Hoklai v Public 
Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 167 and Ong Pang Siew v Public Prosecutor [2011] 
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20 A number of Members of Parliament appeared to be cognisant 
of the possible unfairness to accused persons that would result from the 
change in the law, and one of them commented that:70 
… to ensure the rationale of fairness remains paramount in the trial 
process, we should have, in my view, a long panel list of psychiatrist 
experts, and not restrict the panel to a short list. This will allow a 
mentally ill accused person to see a medical professional he or she is 
most comfortable with. 
21 The Senior Minister of State for Law responded that it was not 
the intention of the amendment to “set an extremely high bar for 
admission to the panel” and it was expected that “most psychiatrists 
with the relevant forensic training will be able to qualify”.71 Notably, 
however, no criteria were set out as to how the selection committee 
would approve admission to the panel, and this is reflected in cl 78 of 
the Reform Bill (which introduces s 270 to the CPC): 
270.—(1) In any criminal proceedings, an opinion of a psychiatrist on 
any matter concerning psychiatry (when given as the opinion of an 
expert) is not admissible as evidence, unless the psychiatrist is a 
member of the panel of psychiatrists (called in this section the Panel) 
established for the purposes of this section. 
(2) A Selection Committee may appoint, or renew the 
appointment of, a psychiatrist as a member of the Panel, for a period 
not exceeding 2 years at a time … 
… 
(4) The Selection Committee may revoke the appointment of a 
psychiatrist as a member of the Panel in such circumstances as may be 
prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Rules. 
(5) Any psychiatrist who is aggrieved by any decision of the 
Selection Committee mentioned in the following paragraphs may 
appeal … 
(6) The decision of the Chief Justice on an appeal under 
subsection (5) is final … 
… 
                                                                                                                               
1 SLR 606), there is some concern (which was raised in Parliament as well when 
the Criminal Justice Reform Bill (Bill 14 of 2018) was debated) that many 
psychiatric experts testifying for accused persons are not of the requisite quality 
(see, for instance, Muhammad Jefrry v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 738; 
Muhammad bin Kadar v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 1205; and Mehra 
Radhika v Public Prosecutor [2015] 1 SLR 96). 
70 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (19 March 2018) vol 94 
(Christopher de Souza). 
71 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (19 March 2018) vol 94 (Indranee 
Rajah, Senior Minister of State for Finance and Law). 
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(8) The Selection Committee consists of the following persons: 
(a) a Judge of the Supreme Court, who is nominated by 
the Chief Justice for such period as the Chief Justice may 
determine, and who is the chairperson of the Committee; 
(b) a District Judge, who is nominated by the Chief 
Justice for such period as the Chief Justice may determine; 
(c) a public officer, who is nominated by the Minister 
charged with the responsibility for health … 
22 The fact that there have not been any selection criteria 
formulated is obviously an issue, but even though there appears to be no 
foreign precedent or practice for reference regarding this amendment, 
this uncertainty is perhaps going to be resolved by the Criminal 
Procedure Rules Committee, which was established pursuant to the 
Reform Bill and will be looking into creating various criminal 
procedural rules to supplement the CPC. That aside, the most 
immediate concern that arises from the introduction of this accredited 
panel is whether psychiatric experts, especially those testifying for 
accused persons, would be unduly self-conscious and guarded when 
presenting their evidence to the court so as to “preserve” their standing 
and reputation for the purposes of being selected or retained for the 
panel.72 Relatedly, if a psychiatric expert is regularly engaged by defence 
counsel – and regularly “loses”, given the very high rate of successful 
convictions in Singapore – does this have any bearing on the expert’s 
credibility and therefore eligibility for the panel? The Ministry of Law 
has responded to public feedback in this vein by providing reassurance 
that “[p]sychiatrists will not lose their place on the panel merely because 
they take a minority view or because the judge does not accept their 
opinion”.73 However, a more fundamental question is why should 
psychiatric experts be subject to this “special” treatment when it seems 
that no other class of expert witness faces a similar (court-administered) 
accreditation process?74 
                                                          
72 Ng Huiwen, “Proposal to Regulate Psychiatric Expert Evidence Raises Concern” 
The Straits Times (30 July 2017), where Jeffrey Pinsler was quoted as commenting 
that a panel of appointed experts could lead to “miscarriages of justice”, 
for instance, when a psychiatrist may be unwilling to state his honest but 
controversial view for fear that he may appear to lack of objectivity and lose his 
place on the panel. 
73 Ministry of Law, “Responses to Feedback Received from the Public Consultation 
on Proposed Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code and Evidence Act” 
(28 February 2018) <https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/dam/minlaw/corp/News/ 
Response%20to%20Public%20Consultation%20Feedback.pdf> (accessed July 2018). 
74 Ironically, Singapore still largely follows the Bolam-Bolitho test – which essentially 
requires the court to defer to medical expertise – for medical negligence cases even 
after the recent Court of Appeal decision of Hii Chii Kok v Ooi Peng Jin London 
Lucien [2017] 2 SLR 492. 
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23 When the proposed change to the law was first mooted, there 
were defence counsel in Singapore that took the view that having a panel 
of psychiatrists could help shave time off court proceedings, assuming 
that the Prosecution did not challenge reports from private practitioners 
– sometimes pejoratively referred to as “hired guns” – tendered by the 
defence in future.75 At the same time, however, if there remained too few 
psychiatrists who were “qualified” to testify, they could be overwhelmed 
by the workload and slow down court processes, to the detriment of 
accused persons who would mostly either be in remand or on bail prior 
to trial.76 This problem might be exacerbated if foreign psychiatrists were 
preferred (whether because of greater expertise, greater expediency, or 
more likely, greater availability), in that such psychiatrists who do not 
have an established “track record” in Singapore might not be so readily 
accepted by the selection committee as credible enough, not to mention 
that it already costs more money and time to hire foreign experts. In 
either scenario, this militates against a party’s liberty to run his case and 
find his own experts as he sees fit within an adversarial model of 
criminal justice. 
24 There are, of course, hitherto largely underused alternatives to 
this new regime in our system. The first is that of court-appointed 
experts, and the second is joint expert reports that have gone through 
“hot-tubbing”. Despite the longstanding concerns expressed by the 
Singapore courts about the great potential for expert witnesses to be 
partisan,77 neither scheme has ever been made compulsory, whether for 
civil or criminal cases. For civil cases, O 40A of the Rules of Court78 may 
allow the court to, inter alia, limit the number of expert witnesses, 
prescribe procedures for putting questions to witnesses and for 
discussion between experts, but it still preserves party autonomy in the 
appointing of experts – and the route of jointly appointed experts is 
completely optional. Further, although O 40 theoretically empowers the 
court to appoint an expert on its own initiative if parties cannot agree on 
an expert, there have been no reported cases of the court exercising this 
power over parties’ objections. This leads one to think that if civil cases 
are given libertarian treatment and can run the full adversarial course, 
why are criminal cases treated more stringently, even if it is only in the 
context of psychiatric experts? 
                                                          
75 Siau Ming En, “Proposed Psychiatric Panel Must Be Large Enough for Smoother 
Defence: Lawyers” Today (28 July 2017). 
76 Siau Ming En, “Proposed Psychiatric Panel Must Be Large Enough for Smoother 
Defence: Lawyers” Today (28 July 2017). 
77 See generally Jeffrey Pinsler, “Expert Evidence and Adversarial Compromise” 
(2015) 27 SAcLJ 55. 
78 Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed. 
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25 One possible justification is that in criminal cases life and 
liberty may be at stake and that the resources of the State and defendant 
could be put to better use if all parties had recourse to a panel of 
psychiatrists who would be objective and professional. Psychiatric 
evidence is often used to aid the court in determining not only criminal 
responsibility but also punishment. If the defence relies on an expert 
who lacks a minimum level of objectivity and professionalism, it is the 
defendant and the interests of justice that suffer as the court is 
essentially left with only one expert’s view. The panel of psychiatrists 
strikes a balance between the two competing considerations of obtaining 
quality evidence by imposing requirements to safeguard objectivity and 
professionalism and allowing room for exercise of choice by providing a 
large enough list of local psychiatric experts and permitting ad hoc 
admissions to the panel of foreign psychiatric experts. 
26 Nevertheless, the move to have a panel of psychiatric experts 
remains an unusual one. It may also be viewed as unnecessary given that 
one would expect defence counsel to generally be able to assist their 
clients in choosing appropriate experts. Additionally, during the second 
reading of the Reform Bill, the Senior Minister of State for Law referred 
to only a “few” instances where psychiatric evidence had fallen short of 
minimum standards (in perspective, there are just under 
300 psychiatrists based in Singapore), suggesting that this was not a 
widespread problem.79 Given that all psychiatrists require professional 
accreditation to practise, perhaps a more proportionate response 
without compromising on a defendant’s freedom of choice of expert 
would be to work with the Singapore Medical Council to enforce ethical 
guidelines for doctors giving expert testimony,80 such that a clear signal 
is sent and the profession is given an opportunity to self-regulate. 
27 With the introduction of the court-administered panel of expert 
psychiatrists, regulation has been taken out of the hands of the medical 
profession and placed in the hands of the selection committee, who will 
comprise a judge of the Supreme Court and a District Judge to be 
nominated by the Chief Justice, and a public officer to be nominated by 
the Minister charged with the responsibility for health. It could be said 
then that the Chief Justice will, through this avenue of a panel of 
psychiatrists, largely be able to control who may appear before the 
courts as psychiatric expert witnesses. This is particularly as the 
selection committee decides by majority vote and the Chief Justice has 
                                                          
79 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (19 March 2018) vol 94 (Indranee 
Rajah, Senior Minister of State for Finance and Law). 
80 Singapore Medical Council, Ethical Code and Ethical Guidelines (2016 Ed) at p 54 
<http://www.healthprofessionals.gov.sg/>. The guidelines provide that performing 
the role of expert witness requires doctors to ensure that they are “competent, 
objective and impartial”. 
© 2018 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders. 
 
 2018 Changes to the Evidence Act and  
 Criminal Procedure Code  
 
two nominees out of a total of three. The Chief Justice also has the final 
say in the event of any appeal being made by any psychiatrist aggrieved 
by the decision of the selection committee. The role of the Chief Justice 
in nominating members and deciding appeals may be justified by the 
purpose of the amendment, which is to safeguard the judicial process 
from psychiatrists that fail to meet a minimum standard of 
professionalism and objectivity, and also on the basis of expediency. 
However, in deciding appeals the Chief Justice may benefit from the 
views of the psychiatrist’s peers as well as the Singapore Medical 
Council. It may therefore be helpful if in operationalising this 
amendment the Criminal Procedure Rules provide some room for the 
consideration of perspectives from the medical profession. This would 
help to build public confidence in the panel as well as promote the 
co-operation of psychiatrists with the courts. There should also be 
continuing efforts to educate psychiatrists and other experts about their 
responsibility to the courts in the course of giving expert testimony. This 
would further help to improve the quality of expert evidence that comes 
before the courts. 
III. DPAs 
A. Origins of the regime 
28 Turning then to the final substantive change to be discussed 
here, DPAs are agreements entered into between a subject charged with, 
or whom the prosecutor is considering charging with, an alleged offence 
and the prosecutor that a criminal case will not be prosecuted if the 
subject complies with complies with certain requirements.81 The origins 
of DPAs can be traced to the US, which initially used DPAs as 
“alternative solutions to rehabilitate individuals charged with non-
violent offense and other low-level crimes, and … defendants who had 
particularly sympathetic or compelling cases” via the Speedy Trial Act82 
drafted in 1974.83 Since 1999, DPAs in the US became used for corporate 
                                                          
81 It should be noted that in the US, there is a distinction between a deferred 
prosecution agreement (“DPA”) and a non-prosecution agreement (“NPA”). 
A criminal action is filed for DPAs but not for NPAs, where the court plays no role 
at all. 
82 88 Stat 2080, as amended August 2, 1979, 93 Stat 328, 18 USC §§ 3161–3174. 
83 Eunice Chua, “Deferred Prosecution Agreements in Singapore?” Singapore Law 
Blog (30 January 2018), citing Paola C Henry, “Individual Accountability for 
Corporate Crimes after the Yates Memo: Deferred Prosecution Agreements & 
Criminal Justice Reform” (2016) 6 Am U Bus L Rev 153 at 157. 
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crimes such as corruption, money laundering and fraud.84 Nevertheless, 
the US Department of Justice does not articulate a list of offences in 
which DPAs can be available, but does the contrary in narrowly defining 
conduct that is not eligible for DPAs.85 The UK has come much later to 
use DPAs and in a more limited way. DPAs were formally introduced 
through the Crime and Courts Act 2013.86 They are only available to 
corporate bodies, partnerships or unincorporated associations and in 
respect of stipulated economic crimes, including money laundering, 
bribery, fraud, and various offences under company law.87 
29 Indeed, following the UK approach, it was in the context of 
corporate crimes that the Ministry of Law first broached the idea of 
introducing DPAs to the Singapore criminal justice system.88 Apart from 
allowing corporations to make reparations for criminal behaviour 
without the collateral damage of convictions (for instance, the jobs and 
investments of innocent employees and shareholders respectively), 
DPAs are meant to avoid lengthy and costly trials without unduly 
compromising the rule of law and hopefully leading to positive change 
in corporate behaviour.89 If the corporation in question does not honour 
the conditions of the DPA, prosecution may resume. In short, DPAs give 
prosecutors a unique tool to deal with corporate offenders – they are not 
required to take down an entire corporation for the misconduct of a few 
individuals.90 
30 On the other hand, there are fundamental transparency 
considerations militating against the complete embracement of DPAs. 
As it were, the right of prosecutorial discretion already enjoys 
                                                          
84 Polly Sprenger, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: The Law and Practice of 
Negotiated Corporate Criminal Penalties (Sweet & Maxwell, 2015) at p 8. 
85 These include matters involving national security, foreign affairs, and as against 
an individual with two or more felony convictions. See s 9-22.100 of the US 
Justice Manual. 
86 c 22 (UK). 
87 Crime and Courts Act 2013 (c 22) (UK) Sch 17, paras 1(1) and 4(1). 
88 Eunice Chua, “Deferred Prosecution Agreements in Singapore?” Singapore Law 
Blog (30 January 2018). 
89 Eunice Chua, “Deferred Prosecution Agreements in Singapore?” Singapore Law 
Blog (30 January 2018); Simon Bronitt, “Regulatory Bargaining in the Shadows of 
Preventive Justice: Deferred Prosecution Agreements” in Regulating Preventive 
Justice: Principle, Policy and Paradox (Tamara Tulich et al eds) (Routledge, 2017) 
at p 215; Wulf Kaal & Timothy Lacine, “The Effect of Deferred and Non-
prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance: Evidence from 1999–2013” 
(2014–2015) 70(1) Business Lawyer 61 at 63–64. 
90 Ellis Martin, “Deferred Prosecution Agreements: Too Big to Jail and the Potential 
of Judicial Oversight Combined with Congressional Legislation” (2013) 18 NC 
Bank Inst 457 at 470–471. 
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tremendous protection in Singapore.91 Article 35(8) of the Constitution 
states: “The Attorney-General shall have power, exercisable at his 
discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for any 
offence.”92 In terms of jurisprudence, the Court of Appeal has reaffirmed 
on numerous occasions that while a challenge of prosecutorial 
discretion is possible on the ground of arbitrariness, the accused person 
bears the near-impossible burden of establishing a prima facie case; 
further, the prosecutor is not obligated to disclose any reasons behind 
any prosecutorial decision and the Attorney-General is also presumed to 
have acted in good faith.93 In light of this, should even greater 
discretionary powers be accorded to the Prosecution through the 
creation of a DPA regime? Although the discourse on prosecutorial 
discretion in Singapore has centred around individual rather than 
corporate offenders, DPAs, in essence, still represent a choice not to 
prosecute what would ordinarily be fairly serious crimes. But whereas 
individual prosecutions are typically declined on the basis of public 
interest or resource constraints,94 DPAs are also motivated by other 
considerations. These include being able to tailor a proportionate 
response to the alleged corporate wrongdoing that may go beyond the 
penalties prescribed by the criminal law (including requiring companies 
to revamp their practices and to agree to being subject to monitoring) 
and incentivising corporate entities to confront criminal conduct and 
co-operate with the authorities to bring individual offenders to justice.95 
There could also be economic reasons as a substantial monetary penalty 
would certainly benefit the Government. 
31 More importantly, the introduction of DPAs raises vital rule of 
law concerns. Using DPAs only for large-scale corporate crime may 
create the impression of a two-tier criminal justice system where large 
companies are “too big to jail”.96 From this perspective, DPAs undermine 
                                                          
91 See generally Chen Siyuan, “The Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Singapore: 
Past, Present, and Future” (2013) 2(1) International Review of Law 1. 
92 Section 11(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) also states: 
The Attorney-General shall be the Public Prosecutor and shall have the 
control and direction of criminal prosecutions and proceedings under this 
Code or any other written law. 
93 See, for instance, Ramalingam Ravinthran v Attorney-General [2012] 2 SLR 49 
at [44]–[74] and Muhammad Ridzuan bin Mohd Ali v Attorney-General [2015] 
5 SLR 1222 at [36]–[41]. 
94 See generally Lucien Wong, “Prosecution in the Public Interest” (2017) 35 Sing 
L Rev 31. 
95 Eunice Chua, “Deferred Prosecution Agreements in Singapore?” Singapore Law 
Blog (30 January 2018); Polly Sprenger, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: The Law 
and Practice of Negotiated Corporate Criminal Penalties (Sweet & Maxwell, 2015) 
at pp 17–19. 
96 Matt Trome, “UK Bribery Prosecutions and the Rule of Law” The Global 
Anticorruption Blog (24 August 2017). See also Simon Bronitt, “Regulatory 
Bargaining in the Shadows of Preventive Justice: Deferred Prosecution 
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the deterrent effect of the law and reduce the incentive to self-report by 
lowering the cost to firms from reputational damage or stigma resulting 
from a criminal settlement.97 This may lead to companies repeatedly 
offending. Finally, by giving the prosecutor the ability to essentially find 
guilt and impose a sentence, there is an argument that could be made 
that the principle of separation of powers is compromised.98 
B. Comparing new regime with regimes elsewhere 
32 In the US and UK, the DPA regimes have tried to deal with the 
above concerns in various ways: first, by making transparent the 
considerations of the prosecutor in relation to DPAs. The UK has a 
binding Code of Practice that is required by legislation and contains, 
amongst others, the test for whether it is possible to enter into a DPA, 
and factors that the Prosecution may take into account in deciding 
whether or not to enter into a DPA. Although not required by 
legislation, the US Justice Manual does contain some of the guidelines 
laid down in various policy memos published by different Attorneys 
General and Deputy Attorneys General over time.99 Most notable of 
these are the Holder memorandum100 (providing guidance on the factors 
that should generally inform a prosecutor in making the decision 
whether to charge a corporation in a particular case),101 the Thompson 
                                                                                                                               
Agreements” in Regulating Preventive Justice: Principle, Policy and Paradox 
(Tamara Tulich et al eds) (Routledge, 2017) at p 218. 
97 Ellis Martin, “Deferred Prosecution Agreements: Too Big to Jail and the Potential 
of Judicial Oversight Combined with Congressional Legislation” (2013) 18 NC 
Bank Inst 457 at 468–469. See also Mike Koehler, “The Façade of FCPA 
Enforcement” (2010) 41(4) Geo J Int’l L 907. 
98 Richard Epstein, “The Deferred Prosecution Racket” Wall Street Journal 
(28 November 2006). 
99 Section 9-28.00 (Federal Prosecution of Business Organisations) of the US Justice 
Manual contains the bulk of the principles, but see also ss 9-16.325 (Plea 
Agreements, Deferred Prosecution Agreements and “Extraordinary Restitution”) 
and 9-28.1300 (Plea Agreements with Corporations). 
100 Memorandum from Attorney General Eric Holder to the United States Attorneys 
and Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, regarding “Department 
Policy on Charging Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Recidivist Enhancements 
in Certain Drug Cases” (12 August 2013). 
101 Polly Sprenger, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: The Law and Practice of 
Negotiated Corporate Criminal Penalties (Sweet & Maxwell, 2015) at pp 86–91. The 
eight factors identified by Holder are: (a) the nature and seriousness of the offence; 
(b) the pervasiveness of the wrongdoing within the corporation; (c) the 
corporation’s history of similar conduct; (d) the corporation’s timely and voluntary 
disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to co-operate in the investigation of 
its agents; (e) the existence and adequacy of the corporation’s compliance 
programme; (f) the corporation’s remedial actions; (g) collateral consequences; and 
(h) the adequacy of non-criminal remedies. 
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memorandum102 (revisions to increase emphasis on and scrutiny of the 
authenticity of a corporation’s co-operation),103 the McNulty 
memorandum104 (addressing two controversial factors – whether a 
company would waive attorney-client privilege with regard to 
conversations had by its employees and whether a company had 
declined to pay attorneys’ fees for its employees)105 and the Morford 
memorandum106 (providing specific explanations for DPAs and non-
prosecution agreements, the weight of collateral consequences, and 
setting out guidance in relation to appointment of independent 
monitors).107 
33 Secondly, through some level of judicial supervision to mitigate 
the risk that the DPA is not in the public interest, or that the corporation 
may be unduly pressured to submit to unduly unfavourable terms.108 In 
the US, there is reference in legislation to the “approval of the court”109 
of DPAs. However, this does not seem to be a very strong check as the 
extent to which judges can oversee the DPAs is not clear. The US 
Department of Justice has maintained that the judge’s role is to grant the 
adjournment agreed to by the parties and that the judge has no 
authority to accept or reject the DPA.110 Federal judges have a different 
view, though, and many have held hearings before granting the 
adjournment sought, with one federal judge asserting his authority to 
review and approve the substance of the agreement by quoting US 
                                                          
102 Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Larry D Thompson to Heads of 
Department Components, United States Attorneys, regarding “Principles of 
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations” (20 January 2003). 
103 Polly Sprenger, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: The Law and Practice of 
Negotiated Corporate Criminal Penalties (Sweet & Maxwell, 2015) at pp 91–92. The 
Thompson memorandum also added a ninth factor – “the adequacy of the 
prosecution of individuals responsible for the corporation’s malfeasance”. 
104 Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Paul J McNulty to Heads of 
Department Components, United States Attorneys, regarding “Principles of 
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations” (11 December 2006). 
105 Polly Sprenger, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: The Law and Practice of 
Negotiated Corporate Criminal Penalties (Sweet & Maxwell, 2015) at pp 93–96. 
106 Memorandum from Acting Deputy Attorney General Craig S Morford to Heads of 
Department Components, United States Attorneys, regarding “Selection and Use 
of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-prosecution 
Agreements with Corporations” (7 March 2008). 
107 Polly Sprenger, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: The Law and Practice of 
Negotiated Corporate Criminal Penalties (Sweet & Maxwell, 2015) at pp 97–98. 
108 Simon Bronitt, “Regulatory Bargaining in the Shadows of Preventive Justice: 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements” in Regulating Preventive Justice: Principle, 
Policy and Paradox (Tamara Tulich et al eds) (Routledge, 2017) at p 219. 
109 18 USC § 3161(h)(2). 
110 Polly Sprenger, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: The Law and Practice of 
Negotiated Corporate Criminal Penalties (Sweet & Maxwell, 2015) at p 81. 
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Supreme Court dicta that federal judges “are not potted plants”.111 
Nevertheless, once the court approves the DPAs, that is the end of 
judicial oversight. The question of whether or not a DPA is breached is a 
matter of prosecutorial discretion. The UK model, on the other hand, 
has made judicial approval a cornerstone of the DPA framework. UK 
judges are involved at various stages of the process beginning with in 
principle approval of a DPA process after negotiations with the 
defendant have commenced. This is done at a private hearing. Next, 
after a defendant has accepted the terms of a draft DPA, the prosecutor 
must again apply to the Crown Court for final approval, following 
another hearing. While that hearing may be private, if the court decides 
to approve the DPA, that decision and reasons for it must be given in 
open court. At both of these stages the court must be satisfied that a 
DPA is in the “interests of justice” and its “terms are fair, reasonable and 
proportionate”. Last, should there be an alleged breach of the DPA that is 
not minor and that cannot be resolved through rectification, the 
prosecutor has to apply to court to seek a finding of breach and explain 
the remedy it seeks. 
34 The third control on DPAs is publication of information, which 
allows for scrutiny and encourages accountability. In the US, all DPAs 
are published, but the Government does not make available any 
consolidated database for DPAs that have been entered into.112 In the 
UK, after the court approves a DPA, the prosecutor is obliged to publish 
the DPA, the initial judicial declaration, the court’s reasons for granting 
it and the court’s final decision to approve it. This is presently done 
through the website of the Serious Fraud Office, which also includes a 
summary of financial statistical information. DPAs are also available to 
the Crown Prosecution Service but none have been entered into as at 
time of writing. 
35 There are quite a number of new CPC provisions on DPAs that 
are too substantial to be reproduced here, but relevant for our purposes 
are the following points about Singapore’s framework: 
(a) DPAs can be entered into before or after charges are 
preferred, but not once the trial begins.113 
                                                          
111 Polly Sprenger, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: The Law and Practice of 
Negotiated Corporate Criminal Penalties (Sweet & Maxwell, 2015) at p 81. 
112 Private entities and academics have filled this gap by publishing their own 
collection of information, for example, Gibson Dunn’s updates on non-
prosecution agreements and deferred prosecution agreements at https://www. 
gibsondunn.com/2017-mid-year-update-on-corporate-non-prosecution-agreements-
npas-and-deferred-prosecution-agreements-dpas/ (accessed July 2018). 
113 Clause 35 of the Criminal Justice Reform Bill (Bill 14 of 2018) adding s 149B to the 
Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed). 
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(b) While a DPA is in force, any existing charge against the 
subject is deemed to be discharged but does not amount to an 
acquittal, the subject cannot be charged for offences covered by 
the DPA, and any limitation period or time limit for civil 
penalties or remedies applicable on conviction will not run.114 
(c) DPAs do not apply to individuals and can only be 
entered with a body corporate, a limited liability partnership, 
a partnership or an unincorporated association.115 
(d) DPAs must contain: (i) a charge or draft charge and a 
statement of facts relating to the alleged offence; (ii) a date on 
which the DPA ceases to have effect if it is not terminated for 
breach; and (iii) the requirements that the DPA will impose, 
which may include a financial penalty, compensation to victims, 
donating money to a third party, implementing a compliance 
programme, appointing a monitor, co-operation in investigations, 
and payment of reasonable costs of the prosecution.116 
(e) DPAs must be approved by the court, with the court 
determining that the DPA “is in the interests of justice” and 
“the terms of the DPA are fair, reasonable and proportionate”. 
The court hearing will be in camera but upon the court’s 
approval, the Public Prosecutor will give public notice of the 
DPA, the court’s declaration and any reasons given by the 
court for its decision, unless prohibited from doing so by law or 
court order.117 
(f) If the Prosecution believes that there has been a breach 
of the DPA, he may apply to the court for a determination of 
whether the subject has failed to comply with the terms of the 
DPA and, if so, to terminate the DPA. The Prosecution is 
obligated to give public notice of the decision of the court and 
any reasons given for that decision, unless prohibited from 
doing so by law or court order.118 
(g) At any time when a DPA is in force, the Prosecution 
and the subject may agree to vary the terms of the DPA. Any 
                                                          
114 Clause 35 of the Criminal Justice Reform Bill (Bill 14 of 2018) adding s 149C to the 
Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed). 
115 Clause 35 of the Criminal Justice Reform Bill (Bill 14 of 2018) adding s 149D to the 
Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed). 
116 Clause 35 of the Criminal Justice Reform Bill (Bill 14 of 2018) adding s 149E to the 
Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed). 
117 Clause 35 of the Criminal Justice Reform Bill (Bill 14 of 2018) adding s 149F to the 
Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed). 
118 Clause 35 of the Criminal Justice Reform Bill (Bill 14 of 2018) adding s 149G to the 
Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed). 
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variation requires court approval in the same manner that a 
DPA is approved.119 
(h) After a DPA has expired, the Prosecution must give 
written notice to the High Court that it does not intend to 
prosecute the subject and give public notice of this, unless 
prohibited from doing so by law or court order. However, he 
may initiate new criminal proceedings against the subject in 
respect of the alleged offence in the DPA where the subject 
provided inaccurate, misleading or incomplete information, and 
the subject knew or ought to have known that the information 
was inaccurate, misleading or incomplete.120 
(i) The High Court may postpone the giving of public 
notice where required for such period it considers necessary 
“to avoid substantial risk of prejudice to the administration of 
justice” in any legal proceedings, any investigation under the 
CPC, or any criminal investigation under any other written law. 
The High Court may also, if satisfied that “it is expedient in the 
interests of justice, public safety, public security or propriety, or 
for other sufficient reason”, order that any information be 
removed or redacted, or that no person is to publish any 
information or do any act that is likely to lead to the publication 
of such information.121 
(j) Where a DPA is approved, the statement of facts 
contained in the DPA may be treated as an admission by the 
subject in any criminal proceedings brought against the subject 
for the alleged offence. Where a DPA is not approved, material 
that shows that the subject entered into negotiations for a DPA 
and material that was created solely for the purpose of 
preparing the DPA or statement of facts may be used in 
evidence against the subject only on a prosecution for an 
offence consisting of provision of inaccurate, misleading or 
incomplete information, or on a prosecution for some other 
offence if in giving evidence the subject makes a statement that 
is not consistent with the material, and evidence relating to the 
material is adduced or a question relating to the material is 
asked by or on behalf of the subject in the proceedings arising 
out of the prosecution. Notwithstanding the above, the Public 
Prosecutor is free to use any material or information obtained in 
                                                          
119 Clause 35 of the Criminal Justice Reform Bill (Bill 14 of 2018) adding s 149H to the 
Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed). 
120 Clause 35 of the Criminal Justice Reform Bill (Bill 14 of 2018) adding s 149I to the 
Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed). 
121 Clause 35 of the Criminal Justice Reform Bill (Bill 14 of 2018) adding s 149J to the 
Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed). 
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the course of negotiations for a DPA or related proceedings, if 
they are determined to be admissible in evidence, against the 
subject or any other person in any criminal proceedings for any 
offence.122 
(k) The following decisions of the High Court are 
appealable: (i) a decision not to approve a DPA; (ii) a decision 
that the subject has failed to comply with the terms of the DPA; 
(iii) a decision that the subject did not fail to comply with the 
terms of the DPA; and (iv) a decision not to approve a variation 
of the terms of a DPA. Only the Prosecution may appeal against 
(i) and (iv).123 
36 During the second reading of the Reform Bill, the Senior 
Minister of State for Law stated that there would be no code of practice 
for the use of DPAs unlike in the UK. This was because it would be 
inconsistent with Singapore’s general position that prosecutorial 
guidelines should not be published to prevent them from becoming 
“a tool for criminals to refer to in manipulating the criminal justice 
system to escape punishment”.124 The Singapore framework lies 
somewhere between the UK and US for the most part, save for the 
matter of making the exercise of prosecutorial discretion more 
transparent where the Singapore position is, unlike the US and UK, 
completely opaque. Judicial supervision in Singapore is closer to the UK 
model than the US, with legislatively provided involvement of the court 
to approve the DPA and any subsequent variation, as well as to supervise 
performance. However, it does not go so far in certain respects. For 
example, there is no need in Singapore as there is in the UK for in 
principle approval from the court after DPA negotiations have 
commenced. The test for the court to apply in approving the DPAs 
borrows from the UK – that the DPA is in the “interests of justice” and 
its terms are “fair, reasonable and proportionate” – making certain that 
the court’s supervision is a substantive one. 
37 In relation to publication of information, Singapore also lies 
between the UK and US. Unlike the UK, which permits some aspect of 
the DPA approval hearings to take place in open court, the hearings in 
Singapore all take place in camera. This has been explained as being 
based on the same underlying philosophy that applies to “without 
prejudice” negotiations – if DPA approval proceedings were held in the 
                                                          
122 Clause 35 of the Criminal Justice Reform Bill (Bill 14 of 2018) adding s 149K to the 
Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed). 
123 Clause 35 of the Criminal Justice Reform Bill (Bill 14 of 2018) adding s 149L to the 
Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed). 
124 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (19 March 2018) vol 94 (Indranee 
Rajah, Senior Minister of State for Finance and Law). 
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public view, and if the DPA did not eventually come into force, the 
company negotiating the DPA could be prejudiced in any future 
criminal proceedings based on the same facts.125 Should companies have 
reason to fear that their willingness to negotiate a DPA may prejudice 
their defence later on, they may be less willing to volunteer information 
and to co-operate with investigations, defeating one of the key purposes 
of the DPA regime. This rationale is an important one and is also 
recognised in jurisdictions like the UK, where although primary 
legislation allows the approval hearing to be in private or public, the 
Code of Practice states that it is “likely to be almost always necessary” 
that the hearing is private due to the uncertainty as to whether the court 
will grant the declaration to approve the DPA.126 It is only where the 
court is granting the declaration to approve the DPA that this will be 
done in open court and oral reasons given there.127 
38 One may also observe that there is no statutory requirement for 
the court to give reasons for its decisions in relation to DPA 
proceedings. This contrasts with the system in the UK where the Crown 
Court must give reasons for whether a DPA is in the interests of justice 
and whether its terms are fair, reasonable and proportionate.128 The 
Senior Minister of State for Law explained the Singapore position as 
follows:129 
[T]he general thinking is this: the DPA is not a judgment. So, it does 
not have a binding effect; stare decisis does not apply. It does not set a 
precedent for other DPAs. Every situation will be highly fact-specific. 
The approval will only be granted if the DPA is in the interests of 
justice, and its terms are fair, reasonable and proportionate. 
She also observed that this would be consistent with the current position 
that places no compulsion on the High Court to publish grounds of 
decision unless there is an appeal. 
39 Nevertheless, other MPs have pointed out that allowing a 
corporation to avoid criminal prosecution for a serious offence is a 
“big deal” and it may instil confidence to require the court to give 
                                                          
125 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (19 March 2018) vol 94 (Indranee 
Rajah, Senior Minister of State for Finance and Law). 
126 Serious Fraud Office, “Deferred Prosecution Agreements Code of Practice – Crime 
and Courts Act 2013” at p 17 https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/ 
documents/publications/dpa_cop.pdf (accessed July 2018). 
127 Cf Michael Bisgrove & Mark Weekes, “Deferred Prosecution Agreements: 
A Practical Consideration” [2014] Crim LR 416 at 435–436, which argues that the 
provision allowing the court to hold the final hearing in private should be used 
sparingly in order to gain public confidence. 
128 Crime and Courts Act 2013 (c 22) (UK) Sch 17, para 8(4). 
129 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (19 March 2018) vol 94 (Indranee 
Rajah, Senior Minister of State for Finance and Law). 
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reasons for approving or not approving a DPA. Although the DPA has 
no binding effect, the same cannot be said of the court’s decision on 
whether to approve DPAs, including its interpretation and application of 
what is “in the interests of justice” and the standard of “fair, reasonable 
and proportionate”, which would have important precedential value and 
would also aid in public education. If there is a concern of prejudice to 
the subject of the DPA should the DPA not be approved, the grounds of 
decision of the court can be redacted to remove any identifying 
information without much difficulty. One could also argue that even if 
the Legislature did not wish to compel the High Court to publish 
grounds of decision, contrary to existing practice, there were other 
options that would address the concerns raised in Parliament such as 
requiring oral reasons to be given by the court, which the Prosecution 
could reproduce in its public notice. Notwithstanding the absence of any 
obligation to give reasons, one can still be optimistic that the courts will 
still do so as the Singapore courts have recognised the common law 
judicial duty to give reasoned decisions in both civil and criminal 
cases.130 Although this judicial duty does not arise in all cases,131 the 
approval, variation or determination of breach in relation to DPAs 
would probably not constitute “very clear cases” “in relation to specific 
and straightforward factual or legal issues” that may constitute 
exceptions,132 particularly in the initial cases and in view of the public 
significance of the court’s decisions. 
40 Apart from having the court give reasons for its decisions in 
relation to DPA proceedings, there is also another aspect to 
transparency centring around the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion 
concerning DPAs, including how companies are chosen for DPA 
negotiations, the conditions for imposing certain terms, the approved 
methods for monitoring for compliance and prosecutorial policy 
towards individual prosecution.133 Although the Senior of Minister of 
State for Law has said that no prosecutorial guidelines will be published, 
this does not preclude media statements, public speeches and other 
communication channels to allow the Prosecution to shed some light on 
the approach of the prosecution in individual cases.134 One can only 
                                                          
130 Thong Ah Fat v Public Prosecutor [2012] 1 SLR 676 at [15]. 
131 A prime example of an exception are routine interlocutory applications: Ten Leu 
Jiun Jeanne-Marie v National University of Singapore [2015] 5 SLR 438 at [47]. 
132 Thong Ah Fat v Public Prosecutor [2012] 1 SLR 676 at [32]. 
133 For example, prosecution policy could require that individual prosecution should 
always follow the entry into deferred prosecution agreements so that wrongdoers 
can be taken to task and to avoid the perception of letting companies off the 
hook easily. 
134 For example, Attorney-General Lucien Wong’s speech at the 2017 Singapore Law 
Review Lecture explaining the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, edited excerpts 
of which were published in Lucien Wong, “The Complex Challenge of Prosecution 
in the Public Interest” The Straits Times (21 October 2017). 
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hope that the Prosecution assesses that the fear that releasing 
information on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion would allow 
criminals to play the system does not apply to the context of corporate 
crimes, and chooses to use these other avenues to communicate with the 
public. 
41 However, even if there is such communication, this is still not 
an officially published guideline or code and it is unclear whether the 
court can rely on these statements in determining whether a DPA is in 
the public interest or assessing the fairness, reasonableness and 
proportionality of its terms. If the Prosecution argues that a DPA is in 
the public interest, the courts may not be in a position to disagree absent 
objective guides of what would generally be appropriate. In justifying 
the DPA and its terms in the three UK cases that have come before the 
UK court,135 the Prosecution has consistently relied on the terms of the 
Code of Practice, amongst other official documents, to identify the 
factors which augur in favour of the DPA being in the interests of justice 
and which factors do not. 
42 Nevertheless, given that the tests in both jurisdictions are 
identical, it is possible for the Singapore courts to draw from the factors 
enumerated in the UK cases, some of which have also been alluded 
during the parliamentary debates. These are: (a) the seriousness of 
the predicate offence(s); (b) the importance of incentivising the 
exposure and self-reporting of corporate wrongdoing;136 (c) the history 
(or otherwise) of similar conduct; (d) the attention paid to corporate 
compliance prior to, at the time of and subsequent to the offending; 
(e) the extent to which the entity has changed both in its culture and in 
relation to relevant personnel; and (f) the impact of prosecution on 
employees and others innocent of any misconduct.137 
43 The same observation may be made regarding the “fair, 
reasonable and proportionate” test for the terms of the DPA. Although 
there is statutory guidance in the UK, US and Singapore in relation to 
the terms and conditions that may be imposed via a DPA, there is still 
much scope for diversity in the combinations of these conditions and 
also a range of severity. In the UK, the court has likewise found the 
                                                          
135 SFO v Standard Bank [2016] Lloyd’s Rep FC 102; SFO v XYZ [2016] Lloyd’s Rep 
FC 509; SFO v Rolls Royce [2017] Lloyd’s Rep FC 249. 
136 In SFO v Rolls Royce [2017] Lloyd’s Rep FC 249, although there was no self-
reporting, the court considered the extraordinary level of co-operation rendered by 
Rolls Royce, which included voluntarily waiving legal professional privilege over 
internal memoranda, and co-operating with the Prosecution’s request to conduct 
investigations. Rita Cheung, “Deferred Prosecution Agreements: Cooperation and 
Confession” (2018) 77(1) Camb LJ 12 at 13. 
137 SFO v XYZ [2016] Lloyd’s Rep FC 509 at [15]. 
© 2018 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders. 
 
 2018 Changes to the Evidence Act and  
 Criminal Procedure Code  
 
Code of Practice useful138 as it recommends three conditions that should 
usually be imposed: (a) a financial penalty; (b) recovery of reasonable 
costs incurred by prosecution; and (c) party co-operation with the 
investigation related to the alleged offence.139 The UK court has also 
referred to sentencing guidelines in gauging the appropriateness of any 
financial penalty.140 These may also be a source of guidance for future 
cases in Singapore. 
44 In conclusion, the amendments to introduce VRIs, regulate 
psychiatric expert testimony and permit DPAs for corporate crimes 
represent concrete responses to perceived areas for improvement in 
Singapore’s current criminal procedure framework. However, the 
implementation of these amendments will not be easy and this comment 
outlines some possible issues and makes suggestions to ameliorate them. 
 
                                                          
138 See references to the Code of Practice in SFO v Standard Bank [2016] Lloyd’s Rep 
FC 102 at [39] and SFO v XYZ [2016] Lloyd’s Rep FC 509 at [40]. 
139 Simon Bronitt, “Regulatory Bargaining in the Shadows of Preventive Justice: 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements” in Regulating Preventive Justice: Principle, 
Policy and Paradox (Tamara Tulich et al eds) (Routledge, 2017) at p 214. 
140 SFO v Standard Bank [2016] Lloyd’s Rep FC 102 at [57]; SFO v XYZ [2016] Lloyd’s 
Rep FC 509 at [57]. 
